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THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF OPEC
Albert L. Danielsen*
University of Georgia and
the Department of Energy
Washington, D. C.

Abstract
Formal theoretical models of world oil price determination have been developed in recent years. In
addition, some empirical estimates of expected future prices have been proposed.
This paper explains
how exhaustible resource and cartel theory are integrated into the opitmal control framework.
Some
empirical studies in the optimal control tradition are surveyed and evaluated.
1.

INTRODUCTION

The Important determinants of world oil prices
are (1) "market structure" including the cohesive
ness of OPEC as a price setting institution, (2)
elasticities of substitution, or the reaction to
actual prices by non-OPEC producers of oil,nat
ural gas, coal, and other energy resources, and
(3) "final product demand elasticities", or the
reaction by consumers who make choices based on
relative prices. Since the evidence on (1), (2),
and (3) is incomplete it is not surprising that
opinion differs regarding the magnitude and direc
tion of future energy prices.
The purpose of this paper is related to the de
termination of world oil prices; it is a conden
sation of some recent theoretical and empirical
analyses which have been used to ascertain
likely future trends in world oil prices.
Emphasis is placed upon contributions found in
professional journals and related papers. The
rationale for choosing this subset of the liter
ature is that most seminal contributions are
contained there.

levels which best serve the economic interests
of producers, given levels of technology, re
source substitutabilities, product demands, and
the market structure or state of competition.
The theoretical approaches relevant to the anal
ysis of OPEC include the theory of depletable
resources, the theory of cartel behavior, and
the theory of individual country behavior, a
variant of the theory of the firm. The strategy
adopted is to present, in Section 2, a brief
account of the exhaustible resources literature
and how it relates to OPEC.
Section 3 con
tains a discussion of cartel theory as applied
to OPEC.
These background discussions are in
cluded because they form the basis for the formal
theoretical models of individual country or group
behavior considered in Section 4 under the head
ing "Optimal Control Theory." Section 5 contains
a summary and critical apprasial of some recent
optimal control models of OPEC, and Section 6 is
the conclusion.
2.

It is important to emphasize the literature not
covered very extensively.
Studies which assume
a specific level of world oil prices and then
outline the repercussions on regions, end uses,
the use of alternative fuels, and the like, are
only briefly considered.
The emphasis is upon
outlining the variables which determine world
oil prices and not upon appraising the effects
of specified price levels.
In addition, the
emphasis is upon economic rather than political
explanations of price determination. The reason
for this restriction is the belief that prices
will not deviate very much or very long from

EXHAUSITIBLE RESPURCES LITERATURE

The exhaustible resources literature is based on
contributions by H. Hotelling [12], 0. Herfindahl
[10], A. Scott [18], R. L. Gordon [9], R.G. Cum
mings [3], J»L. Sweeney [20], and others. It may
be viewed as an attempt to formulate a theory to
explain the actual course of resource prices or
as an effort to assist social planners in allo
cating an increasingly scarce resource.
In the
former case one is attempting to explain real
world behavior whereas in the latter the analyst
attempts to show how some social objective can
be attained.
The former is designed to determine
the level of output a private resource owner will
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select under various market conditions (e.g.,
pure competition, duopoly, or monopoly). The
latter is designed to ascertain the level of
output which a social planner should select for
the good of society or a significant subgroup.
Most studies of OPEC treat individual countries
as "firms" and OPEC as a monopolist, duopolist,
oligopolist, or residual supplying firm. The
emphasis in this paper is upon the actual course
of world oil prices.

by a plausible line of reasoning for purely ocmpetitive firms. Assuming there are cost differ
entials among competitive producers the lowest
cost producers will operate until their resource
deposits are exhausted, then the next higher
cost producers will enter the market, and so on
[19, 3-5]. This line of reasoning is an exten
sion of that applicable to an owner of a "mine"
or "resource deposit" since he will extract his
most accessible or least costly reserves first.

The unit of analysis is individualistic and the
objective function is generally assumed to be
the present value of the decision maker's ex
pected future earnings subject to a constraint
upon the total availability of the resource.

If a resource were absolutely indispensible its
market price would rise at the market rate of
interest to infinity. An ever smaller popula
tion would bid for an ever dwindeling quantity
available. However, no energy resource is in
dispensible.
Energy resources which are pre
sently being exploited are cost-effectively
cheap relative to more or less viable alterna
tives.
Thus, as the "net" and market prices
of resources presently exploited rise alterna
tive resources become cost-effectively cheap.
The concept of a "backstop technology" is a
special case of the general tendency to substi
tute cost-effectively low-cost resources for
high cost ones, regardless of the reasons under
lying the cost differentials.
Nordhaus defined
the backstop technology in a special sense as
the " ... ultimate technology - resting on a
very abundant resource base - ..." [15, 532].

The assumptions underlying the model are:
1. there is a limited finite quantity of the
resource;
2.

technology is given;

3. extraction costs are greater than or equal
to zero;
4.

costs increase as the reserve is depleted;

5.

the demand function is given;

6. the price received for the resource is
positive.

3.

Given these conditions the firm seeks to maxi
mize the present value of the stream of profits
accruing to it over time.
Hotelling was the first to work out the impli
cations of these assumptions for an individual
mine owner under competitive and monopolistic
conditions. He simplified the problem somewhat
by assuming marginal extraction costs constant
and dealt with "net price" or the " ... price
received after paying the cost of extraction
and placing upon the market ..." [12, 141],
Under free competition, and assuming an initial
equilibrium, the net price will rise at the
market rate of interest.
Under monopoly, and
assuming an initial profit maximizing net price,
the net price will rise at the market rate of
interest. Under monopoly, and assuming an initial
profit maximizing net price, the net price will
rise less rapidly than the market rate of interest
and may eventually be lower than the purely com
petitive price; in any case production is more
protracted under monopoly than under conditions
of pure competition [12, 152]. This feature
prompted Solow to quip"... that if a conservat
ionist is someone who would like to see resources
conserved beyond the pace that competition would
adopt, then the monopolist is the conservationists
friend." [19, 8].
This relatively simple framework, applicable to
an individual firm or mine, is extended to the
industry by definition for the monopolist and
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CARTEL THEORY

Cartel theory as applied to OPEC is simply an
offshoot of conventional microeconomic theory.
The theoretical contributions include those of
M. Adelman [1], A. Danielsen [4], and D. Osborne
[16].
Cartel theory may be used to explain the
course of world oil prices in much the same way
that the purely competitive model is used to
explain the price of a commodity. It is first
necessary to posit the existence of a cartel and
that the cartel price is greater than it would
be under competitive conditions. Since marginal
revenue exceeds marginal costs for each country
there are incentives for each country to expand
output. But in order to sell more in the shortrun a country must have shut-in capacity and be
willing to lower or "shave" prices to entice
prospective buyers away from other producers.
If large volumes of capacity are shut-in and
price— shaving becomes wide spread then the col
lusive arrangement will break down.
If price
shaving is largely absent then the collusive or
cartel price holds, regardless of how much capa
city is shut-in.
Every successful cartel faces the short-run prob
lem of maintaining the extablished cartel price
by ensuring that all participants are reasonably
content. In the long-run the cartel faces the
same set of problems but they are complicated
by the fact that additional capacity can be
brought on stream.
It should be emphasized that
each country has a degree of autonomy and that
there are inherent conflicts of interest among
them regarding the total revenue each should

receive vis a'vis the others, their time prefer
ences for income, and their desired growth rates
of production and of capacity.
In addition,
their assessments of world and OPEC demand elas
ticities may differ, thus complicating an already
difficult set of problems.
The success of OPEC in holding the world price of
oil above marginal costs is itself a stimulus to
the development of excess capacity.
This is a
continual threat to the maintenance of cartel
prices. This problem is composed of two parts,
the incentive to substitute non-OPEC for OPEC
produced energy, and the incentive for member
countries of OPEC to expand capacity beyond the
optimum from the standpoint of the cartel. The
only thing OPEC can do to influence the former
is to establish their price schedules at low
levels or promote uncertainty about the main
tenance of high prices over time. The latter is
a matter of internal cartel discipline and will
not be pursued in this paper.
4.

OPTIMAL CONTROL THEORY

The basic ideas in the exhaustible resources
and cartel literature have been formalized into
a theory of individual or group behavior and
incorporated into the "optimal control" frame
work [20], [8], and [5], The decision-making
unit may be an individual country, a sub-group
of countries within OPEC, or OPEC considered
as a whole (i.e, monopolist or residual sup
plier). The decision making unit is assumed to
exist in a world in which all demand, supply,
technological, and market structure relations
are given. The task is for him to select a
price trajectory through time which will achieve
the desired objective, usually maximizing the
present value of net revenue. The problem differs
only in the constraints relevant for the case of
a purely competitive firm, a monopolist, or a
cartel.
4.1

The optimal extraction path may be denoted as
s*(t). The familiar profit maximizing rule of
equating marginal revenue to marginal cost is
altered by the fact that the resource will ulti
mately be depleted. Using up the resource means
foregoing its use in the future, The profit
maximizing condition may be expressed as:
(1)

p(t) = c" + A ert

where c " = 3[c(s(t)]/3 s(t) is marginal extrac
tion cost, and A ert is interpreted as the oppor
tunity cost of using the resource at t. Since
A > 0 it follows that price exceeds marginal
extraction cost. It is also easy to see that if ex
traction costs are zero price will rise at the
rate r; similarly, if one deals with "net price"
as Hotelling did, then net price or p(t)-c^ will
rise at the rate r.
4.2

MONOPOLISTIC MODEL

A monopolist is faced with a similar problem,
the main difference being that the market price
is dependent upon the total demand and remaining
supply; it is therefore dependent on all pre
vious output as well as the rate at which the
resource is currently extracted. Thus, the
objective function for the monopolist is:

Since the monopolist owns all deposits he maxi
mizes net present value over all resource deposits
rather than over an individual field or well.

PURELY COMPETITIVE MODEL

Under pure competition a resource owner must take
into account his (1) total resources (R0) (2)
prices received over time (p(t)) (3) extraction
costs (c(t)) (4) rate of extraction s(t), and
(5) discount factor (r) . His problem may be
posed as maximizing an objective function under
a resource constraint:

Associated with the optimal extraction path,
S*(t), is an optimal price trajectory, p*(S(t),
t) or simply s* and p*. A profit maximizing
condition similar to equation (1) may be expresed
as
(2) P' = C' + \'eTt
where the primes refer to the partial deriva
tives of the total revenue and cost functions and
X' is now a complex function indicating oppor
tunity costs for the monopolist.
4.3

CARTEL MODEL

Except for the limiting cases where a cartel is
so closely knitted that it functions as a mono
polist or so disorganized that the market func
tions as a set of purely competitive firms the
problem is altered. In the intermediate cases
where a cartel is viable but not perfectly
cohesive it is useful to posit two groups, a
cartel group or "dominant group" within the car
tel and a competitive fringe of firms who stand

where price is a function of time, cost is a
function of the extraction rate and time, r and
Ro are constants, and s(t) is selected to maxi
mize Fc .
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ready to capture an increasing share of the
market.
The model is applicable in two special
instances.
First, a cartel which includes all
producers but has internal dissention may be
thought of as a dominant group and a competitive
fringe within a cartel. Second, a cartel which
has a dominant position in an industry but does
not include all producers.
In this case the
competitive fringe functions outside the cartel.
Empirical models of OPEC have been constructed
for both cases.
The erosion of market share is a problem for any
cartel but in the present c o n t e x such
erosion is complicated by the fact that the re
source is depletable for both the cartel and the
competitive fringe. Thus, the problem from the
standpoint of the cartel is the maximize a rather
complex objective function subject to both in
ternal and external constraints. The cartel
or oligopolists problem may be expressed as a
limit-pricing problem:

where x(t) is output by the competitive fringe,
p is the "limit price" or that price which would
totally eliminate additional production by the
competitive fringe, and 3 represents a variety
of parametric variables which may influence the
rate of technological change, substitutability
of other energy resources for oil, etc.
The solution to this problem involves the gener
alized Hamiltonian multiplier and yields both an
optimal price trajectory, p*, and an optimal tra
jectory of output by the competitive fringe,
x*. It follows directly that there is also an
optimal trajectory for cartel output, s*.
These formal models are useful since they empha
size the important variables the analyst needs
to consider as well as their hypothesized inter
relations.
The variables have both a spatial and
temporal dimension. Ignoring the time dimen
sion and designating cartel or "dominant group"
variables by the subscript "a", and competitive
fringe variables by "b", the variables may be
summarized as:

Total Demand

D

Production

s

Discount rates

Prices

a
Sb
r

a
rb
n

The specific assumptions about these variables
vary from one study to another and are the sub
ject matter of Section 5.
5.

RECENT EMPIRIAL STUDIES OF OPEC

Empirical studies in the optimal control tradi
tion include those of Nordhaus [15], Kalymon [13],
Cremer and Weitzman [2], Hnyilicza and Pindyck
[11], Gately, Kyle, and Fischer [8], and Marshalla
[14]*1/ These studies are similar from a broad
conceptual point of view in that each seeks to
determine either the most probable path of world
°il prices or the probable and maximum price tra
jectories. For example, Pindyck [17] calculates
the potential gains from cartelization by substracting the present value of OPEC revenues in a
purely competitive environment from those under
monopoly.
Hnyilicza and Pindyck [11] seek to
determine the extent to which the price trajec
tory for a two-part cartel will differ from that
of a monopoly. Cremer and Weitzman [2] are
interested in quantifying what long-term oil
prices would be if OPEC maximizes the present
value of its net income stream. Gately, Kyle,
and Fischer [8] are interested in the same prob
lem but the emphasis is upon the optimal price
paths for OPEC under a variety of assumptions.
They are all aware that "... the implications of
any given price path for OPEC's profits and capa
city utilization are very sensitive to the choice
of parameter values." [6, 17],
Since the basic structure of the various models
is identical, it is useful to specify the general
procedure necessary to calculate the price tra
jectories. In each case the following equations
for crude oil are specified:
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)
(F)

the objective functions),
the total world demand,
supply by the competitive fringe,
residual OPEC demand,
costs of production,
total reserves

In addition, the following parameters are speci
fied:

Reserves
(G)
(H)

discount rates and,
time horizon.

Costs
Each of these will be considered in this section
as well as the results of several of the more
recent models.

5.1

OBJECTIVE FUNCTION (S)

The objective function is a profit maximizing
function of the form Fc as specified in Section
4. The more elementary models such as those
of Pindyck [17] and Marshalla
[14] focus on OPEC
as a unified decision-making entity so that only
OPEC has an objective function. These are
strictly residual supply models. Hnyilicza and
Pindyck [11] are mostly concerned with the
weights which enter the objective function of
a two-part cartel or how the cartel decides
upon a weighted average objective function of
two participant groups.
This is also a residual
supply model but with emphasis on internal bar
gaining. Cremer and Weitzman [2] posit an
objective function for both OPEC and the com
petitive fringe.
In order to empirically
derive price trajectories it is assumed that
OPEC announces a sequence of all future prices;
the competitive fringe then sets its production
levels to maximize the present value of its
discounted profits. OPEC then becomes the resid
ual supplier. The Cremer and Weitzman formulation
is a two-group recursive model. This seems to be
a step in the right direction. Other possibiliare o-country recrusive models or two-group
or n-group simultaneous equations approach. The
computational difficulties or the latter are of
course formidable.
5.2 WORLD DEMAND
The empirical models assume relatively simple
total demand functions. Hnyilicza and Pindyck
specify demand as:
(5-2-1) Dt*1.0-.13 Pat + .87 D t_1 + 2.3
(1.015)t

•here the .015 growth rate in the last term cor
responds to an assumed 3 percent growth rate of
real income and a 0.5 long-run income elasticity.
Cremer and Weitzman employ:
(5-2-2) Dt - (21-0.6p)(l+g)t

■here g is the growth rate of world demand.
Marshalla'a demand function is derived from the
**der*l Energy Administration IEES model and
the Stanford Research Institute-Gulf Energy
Model (SRI-GEM) and is of the general form:

and the functional form is log-linear and thus
yields constant price elasticities of demand.
Another innovation by Marshalla is the use of a
relative demand function where each variable in
equation (5-2-3) is divided by its equivalent
generated by the IEES or SRI-GEM models.
The
results are, therefore, relative deviations from
the results obtained in the reference models.
5.3

COMPETITIVE FRINGE SUPPLY

Supply functions of the competitive fringe are
also relatively simple functions in the
Hynilicza and Pindyck and Marshalla models. The
former makes competitive supply a linear function
of previous supply, a non-linear increasing
function of price, and decreasing function of
cumulative supply (Sbt). The Sbt variable is an
alternative to "remaining reserves" which are
Rbt * Ro ~ Sb t . The specific equation is written:
(5-3-1) sbt = (1.1 + .10pt).(1.02)“ Sbt/7
+.75 Sbt-1
Marshalla's functional form and treatment of
competitive fringe supply is identical to that
of his total demand, including the use of "rela
tive" supply functions.
As indicated before Cremer and Weitzman derive the
competitive fringe supply schedule using an objective function. The sequence of prices for all
future periods is given by the dominant group with
in the cartel. A "trace" of the output level used
in the optimal solution by the competitive fringe
is their level of output or supply over time.
5.4

RESIDUAL OPEC DEMAND

All of the models under review are "residual
demand" or "residual supplier" models.
The resi
dual is simply total demand less competitive fringe
supply. The group which constitutes the residual
supplier differs in each model. The residual
supplier establishes prices by selecting the price
trajectory which maximizes the discounted value of
income derived from the sale of its petroleum
reserves. A price trajectory which is "too high"
will dampen world demand and stimulate competitive
supply; a trajectory which is "too low" will have
the opposite effect and result in OPEC depleting
their resources too early. The optimal price tra
jectory is neither too high nor too low and is
obtained by an iterative procedure.

(5-2-3) Dt “ Edit

5.5 - 5.6

^it “ Bii log pit + Bt2 log dft-l

Production costs are an increasing function of
cumulative production or vary inversely with
remaining reserves. The precise equation used by
Hnyilicza and Pindyck is:

■here i ■ 1, 2, 3, 4 regions.
Me considers the disaggregated demand and the
link to established models one of the principal
advantages of his model over previous efforts.
However, the specification should still be re
tarded as relatively simple since the larger
•odels contain few independent variables, a dis
tributed lag structure is assumed but is untested,

PRODUCTION COSTS AND TOTAL RESERVES

5-5-1) cat - 250/Rat
where R is in billions of barrels.
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Cremer and Weitzman break costs into "current,"
"capital", and "transportation" costs for both
the dominant cartel group and the competitive
fringe. Then current costs (ca) are specified
as:

value calculations. Thus, in almost all cases
an approximate 50-100 year time horizon has
been selected. The notable exception is the
study by Nordhaus who uses 200 years.

(5-5-2) ca = k Rao/Rat

5.9

WORLD PRICE TRAJECTORIES BASED ON
EMPIRICAL MODELING

where k is a constant.
One should not be surprised if the conclusions
differ markedly among the various models.
Focusing on the world oil price trajectory
Pindyck concludes that under monopoly (r=.10)
the price would be $14.08 in 1975, decline to
$10.19 by 1979 and then rise to $20.52 in 2010.
The competitive price trajectory would result
in $4.62 in 1975 rising to $25.48 in 2010.
The Hnyilicza and Pindyck model results in a
price of $14.39 in 1975, declining to $10.30
in 1979 and then rising to $20.61 in 2010.

Capital and transportation costs are assumed to
be constants.
Marshalla uses a "Low Cost" case similar to
equation (5-5-1) and a "High Cost" case of the
form:
(5-5-3)

ca - Bc + f>!

<Sat)2

where the 8's are constants and sat is again
cumulative supply.

Cremer and Weitzman deal with discrete 10-year
time periods but their conclusions are remark
ably similar to those of Hnyilicza and Pindyck.
In their "preferred" specification prices rise
gently from $9.80 to $10.30 over the period 19751995, increase to $14.70 during 1995-2005, and
to $20.80 during 2005-2015.
In all, they report
the results of eleven different parameter speci
fications as alternatives to the preferred model.
The highest prices would occur if the annual
growth rate of world demand were 6 percent;
prices would rise from $12.30 in 1975-1885 to
$27.60 in 2005-2015 under this scenario.

Thus, in each case the trend of projected costs
is plausible but not based on firm geological or
engineering appraisals. Marshalla performed
a sensitivity analysis by varying reserves by 50
percent but direct sensitivity tests on unit
costs have not been very extensive.
5.7

DISCOUNT RATES

A relatively high discount rate makes the early
conversion of oil to money more desirable.
Hnyilicza and Pindyck use rates of both .05 and
.10, Marshalla .04, .06, and .08, and Cremer
and Weitzman .05 for the dominant group and
.08 for the competitive fringe. The higher
rates result in high levels of output and low
prices in the early years and a lower price tra
jectory overall. The discount rate or "rate of
time preference" for money is used to distin
guish the dominant group from the competitive
fringe. The competitive fringe is in all cases
assumed to have a higher rate of time preference
than the dominant group. Hnyilicza and Pindcyk
call the dominant group "saver countries" and the
remainder "spender countries." The rational for
spender countries having the higher discount rate
is based on their large population and revenue
needs for economic dedevelopment. Thus, the
competitive fringe tends to produce a larger
proportion of total output in the near term
whereas the dominant group's share eventually
predomlnantes. This presumed discount rate dif
ferential has a marked effect on the pattern of
crude oil output and upon the general conclusion
that prices will not rise very greatly during the
next twenty years.
5.8

Marshalla does not calculate "probable" or
"most likely" price trajectories but rather
"efficient ones" under the assumed conditions.
His base case uses the high extraction cost
function, a 6 percent discount rate, 830 billion
barrels for OPEC reserves and the coal-based
synthetics reference supply path. The most
striking result is that price over the next 15
years is very low compared to current prices.
The price for the period, 1976 to 1977, is
$4.29, rises to $8.45 by 1990 and reaches a high
of $31.85 when OPEC runs out of oil in 2025.
It may come as no surprise that present prices
far exceed "efficient" world prices and that
large monopoly rents are currently being received.
6.

CONCLUSION

It would be valid to criticize the efforts to
model OPEC on grounds that they are relatively
naive representations of the real world. With fe*
exceptions, the data requirements are not very
demanding, the basic equations include only
a few variables, their functional forms have not
been subjected to testing, the special and
temporal interrelations (including lag relations)
have been tested extensively, and there is no
proof that the world oil market functions as
postulated by the "residual supplier" framework.

TIME HORIZON

Theoretically, production will take place to
infinity or until depletion. As a practical
matter the discount rate ensures that net
revenues received much beyond 50 years in the
future will not weigh heavily on present
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On the other hand, the modeling efforts are
useful for understanding expected future price
trends and for policy-making because they focus
upon some of the more important variables which
determine prices.
The market structure, total
resource availabilities, unit costs of produc
tion and distribution, and the rates of time pre
ference for money are all important determinants
of future energy prices.
Those who have con
structed formal models have made contributions
by highlighting probable interrelations.
The
much more difficult task is to determine the
magnitude of the variables and to more accurately
specify the interrelations among countries and
variables in the real world.
Few analysts are
content with either the scope of precision of
the theoretical and empirical analyses of OPEC
but one may anticipate that more detailed speci
fications will be based on the formal models
developed to date.
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